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I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes cases of interest to employers decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois Appellate Courts from June 2014June 2015 in both private and public sectors.
Within the last year, the Illinois Supreme Court was required to
analyze a case, which came from the Fifth District, Michael v. Precision
Alliance Group, LLC,1 which involved a causation issue in an agriculturalbased retaliatory discharge claim. The appellate court cases addressed
various other issues including age discrimination, arbitration, union issues
and school district cases, unemployment benefits, and negligent hiring and
retention. Illinois Acts were also examined, such as the Illinois Personnel
Record Review Act, the Whistleblower Act, and the Drug Free Work Place
Act.
The cases discussed within this article are organized by subject, as
displayed in the outline above.
II. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Cipolla v. The Village of Oak Lawn2
In Cipolla,3 the Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the circuit
court’s ruling in favor of the employer. At age 60, Diane Cipolla
(“Cipolla”) was a 12-year employee of the Village of Oak Lawn
(“Village”).4 Cipolla was the business regulation officer for the Village’s
finance department.5 In 2008, the Village manager informed Cipolla that
her job was being eliminated due to budget constraints.6 Cipolla
subsequently filed a claim against the Village alleging age discrimination in
violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act.7
Cipolla argued that on the day before she was terminated, the Village
board met in a closed executive session and her supervisor commented that
Cipolla was “older,” and that her position would be eliminated and her job
responsibilities transferred to another Village employee who was 20 years
younger.8 Cipolla contended that budget constraints were only a pretext for
her termination, because not long after her termination, the Village hired a
1,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

2014 IL 117376.
2015 IL App (1st) 132228, ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id.
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (West 2012).
Cipolla, 2015 IL App (1st) 132228, ¶ 6.
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budget director for a higher salary than she received as the business
regulation officer.9 The Village denied Cipolla’s allegations and argued
that no other similarly situated younger employees were treated differently.
Furthermore, the Village never sought a replacement for her position.10 The
Village explained that Cipolla was terminated for budgetary reasons, given
that it had a deficit of more than $1 million and as a result, cut personnel
costs.11
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Village and denied
Cipolla’s motion for a new trial.12 Cipolla appealed, arguing that the circuit
court abused its discretion by refusing to clarify for the jury the meaning of
the word “fired” and that the jury should have been given a “cat’s paw”
liability instruction, which places liability on an employer when a
supervisory employee acts with discriminatory intent to cause a higher-up
employee to take adverse action against the plaintiff.13 The First District
affirmed, holding the jury’s question whether “fired” included laid off,
terminated, or elimination of Cipolla’s position was a question of fact for
the jury to decide, and the court did not abuse its discretion.14 The court
also held that the evidence at trial did not warrant a cat’s paw liability
instruction and therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in that
regard.15 The court noted that to succeed under the cat’s paw theory, a
plaintiff must show the non-decision maker exercised such “singular
influence” over the decision maker that the decision to terminate was the
product of “blind reliance.”16 The court held that the Village manager had
the authority to make all personnel decisions.17 Department directors could
make recommendations regarding hiring and firing of employees, but there
was no testimony indicating that the Village manager blindly relied on the
finance department director when he decided to terminate Cipolla.18 In
addition, for Cipolla’s termination to become final, the budget amendments
that proposed the elimination of the business licensing officer position had
been approved by the majority of the Village board.19 Thus, the Appellate
Court concluded that Cipolla was not prejudiced by the circuit court’s
decision not to give the cat’s paw liability instruction.20

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶¶ 28, 42, 44.
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 45.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 45.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 46.
Id. at ¶ 47.
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III. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
Retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the general rule that a
non-contractual or at-will employee may be discharged by his or her
employer at any time and for any reason.21 Under the doctrine, an employer
may not discharge an employee if a clear mandate of public policy is
involved.22 In Illinois, retaliatory discharge actions have been allowed in
two settings: (1) where an employee is discharged for filing, or in
anticipation of filing, a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act23 or;
(2) where an employee is discharged in retaliation for the reporting of
illegal or improper conduct, otherwise known as “whistleblowing.”24 The
rationale is that in these situations, an employer could effectively frustrate a
significant public policy by using its power of dismissal in a coercive
manner. Therefore, recognition of a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge is considered necessary to vindicate the public policy underlying
the employee’s activity, and to deter employer conduct inconsistent with
that policy.25
To sustain a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, an employee
must prove: (1) the employer discharged the employee, (2) the discharge
was in retaliation of the employee’s activities, and (3) the discharge violates
a clear mandate of public policy.26
A. Michael v. Precision Alliance Group27
In Michael,28 the plaintiff Wayne Michael (“Michael”) filed a
retaliatory discharge claim against the defendant, Precision Alliance Group,
LLC (“Precision”), an agricultural supply business dealing in soybean
seeds. Michael alleged that he and two of his co-workers were discharged
in retaliation for reporting Precision to the State of Illinois for shipping
underweight product.29 In the year prior to the lawsuit, Precision began
experiencing a problem with underweight seed bags, which was a violation
under an Illinois law that required every bag to be labeled as containing a
certain weight of seeds actually weigh that amount.30

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 182 (1978).
Id. at 183.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq. (1992).
Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 376 (1998).
Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505 (1991).
Turner v. Mem’l Medical Ctr. 233 Ill. 2d 494, 500 (2009).
2014 IL 117376.
Id. at ¶¶ 1–3.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 6.
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After co-worker Shawn Dudley (“Dudley”) was terminated for
horseplay, Precision’s seed bag weight problems were reported to the
Illinois Department of Agriculture. When Dudley’s unemployment
compensation was denied, Michael and several of his co-workers assisted
Dudley by providing him the lot numbers and locations of underweight
bags.31 Approximately a month later, Precision’s corporate office decided
to eliminate 22 positions as a result of slow business.32 Michael and three
others, including one of the assisting co-workers, were chosen for
termination.33 The evidence showed that Michael was dismissed because
he spent too much time standing around, needed a more diverse skill set,
and did not want to perform certain tasks.34 Furthermore, when he finished
his tasks, he would not look for other tasks.35 The management staff
claimed they were unaware that Michael or his co-worker had any role in
reporting the company to the Department at the time they were discharged
and only learned of their involvement during discovery of the case.36 The
circuit court entered judgment in favor of Precision, finding that it offered a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Michael and his
coworker, and that they had failed to prove the reason for their discharge
was pretextual.37
The Appellate Court, Fifth District, reversed the decision, reasoning
that the circuit court erroneously increased the plaintiff’s burden by
requiring them to prove both causation and to disprove defendant’s defense
of pretext.38 The case was remanded for further proceedings on the issue of
plaintiffs’ damages.39 On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Precision
argued that the appellate court improperly relieved plaintiffs of the burden
to establish the case.40 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed.41 Although the
circuit court applied the wrong standard in this case, the Court nevertheless
agreed with the circuit court’s conclusion that Precision presented valid and
legitimate reasons for plaintiffs’ discharges, and that the plaintiffs failed to
meet their burden of proving that they were discharged in retaliation for
their protected activity.42 The Court explained that the Fifth District
improperly held that plaintiffs proved causation based on the circuit court’s
finding of a “causal nexus” between plaintiffs’ discharges and their
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 17.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 19–22.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id.; see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013).
Michael, 2014 IL 117376 ¶ 33.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36.
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protected activity.43 Thus, the Court further held that plaintiffs failed to
prove the element of causation, and therefore, found that the circuit court
further properly entered judgment in favor of Precision.44 The Court
concluded that the Appellate Court erred in reversing that judgment.45
B. Flick v. Southern Illinois Healthcare, NFP46
Causation between a plaintiff’s discharge and a protected activity was
also addressed by the Fifth District case Flick.47 There, Cindy Flick
(“Flick”) worked for the defendant, Southern Illinois Healthcare, NFP,
(“SIH”) as the director of its medical laboratories.48
During her
employment, Flick discovered quality control failures in the chemistry
department at one of the defendant’s hospitals, which constituted a
violation of the federal Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 (“CLIA”).49 She reported her concerns to the medical director and the
manager of the lab.50 Months later, the hospital administrator told Flick
that her management style was not conducive to a long-term relationship
with the hospital and presented her with a severance agreement.51 Days
later, Flick called the compliance help line to report her concern regarding
possible CLIA violations in the laboratory and then rejected the severance
agreement. Flick’s employment was not terminated but her responsibilities
were limited and her salary was frozen. She continued her employment for
approximately two more years. During that time, she was responsible for
ensuring the company’s smooth transition in converting to a new computer
system.52 The transition was problematic. The hospital administrator again
approached Flick with a severance package, and despite her refusal to
accept, Flick’s employment was terminated.53
Flick filed a petition alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for
reporting possible violations of CLIA.54 She alleged that prior to the
“attempt to terminate” her employment, her performance reviews were
favorable and she received annual pay increases.55 She testified that she
believed that the only reason she was not fired after she declined the first
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 37.
Id.
2014 IL App (5th) 130319.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 4; 42 U.S.C. § 263a et seq. (2000).
Flick, 2014 IL App (5th) 130319, ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶¶ 4–5.
Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id.
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severance agreement was because she had reported to the CLIA hotline.56
In response, SIH filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Flick
presented no evidence of a causal connection between her actions in raising
concerns about the lab’s compliance with CLIA and her termination.57 The
court granted the motion, finding that Flick exercised a statutory right when
she called the CLIA compliance hotline, but that she could not establish
that her discharge was in retaliation for exercising this right just because of
timing.58
On appeal, Flick argued that the court erred in finding that she did not
engage in “protected activity” until she called the compliance help line to
report the possible CLIA violations two days after she was presented with
her first severance agreement.59 According to Flick, the fact that she voiced
her concerns about the lab’s procedures prior to the meeting was also a
protected activity.60 The Appellate Court, Fifth District, agreed that voicing
her concerns was protected activity, but Flick failed to prove any evidence
of a causal connection.61 Flick also argued that the court erred in finding
that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding causation
because the two-year gap in time between her activity and termination does
not automatically defeat a claim that the termination was retaliatory.62
The court held that Flick’s second argument also failed, and reiterated
the plaintiff’s requirement to present evidence of a causal connection.63
The court noted that Flick presented no evidence to support her theory that
the hospital administrator was prevented from discharging her initially and
needed to wage a two-year campaign of retaliatory actions to discharge her
later.64 Flick acknowledged that her employment with SIH was at-will and
there was no evidence that SIH was required to document ongoing
dissatisfaction in order to terminate her employment.65 Therefore, the court
concluded that it was the plaintiff’s burden to provide evidence of the
causal link between a retaliatory motive and her discharge, and therefore
the circuit court properly granted summary judgment.66

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶¶ 17–18.
Id. at ¶ 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Id.
Id.
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C. Taylor v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago67
In another appellate court decision, this time for the Appellate Court,
First District, the court distinguished whether a retaliatory discharge claim
applied to an at-will employee compared to a contractual employee in
Taylor.68 In that case, plaintiff Kenneth Taylor (“Taylor”) began his
employment with the defendant, the Board of Education of the City of
Chicago (“Board”), as a teacher at Robeson High School.69 Shortly
thereafter, he attained tenure.70 After continuing his education and
obtaining a master degree, the Board promoted him to serve as the assistant
principal at Goodlow Magnet School (“Goodlow”), an elementary school
for students from pre-kindergarten through eighth grade.71 The assistant
principal position was contractual with a four-year duration, after which his
contract could be terminated “for cause.”72 Upon accepting this position,
Taylor relinquished his tenured status.73
During his employment, Taylor was informed that a special education
teacher kicked a student and caused the student to fall backwards and strike
his head on the floor.74 Taylor was designated a “mandated reporter” of
child abuse under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act,75 which
requires all school personnel to immediately report any reasonable
suspicion of child abuse to the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (“DCFS”). Accordingly, Taylor reported the incident to the
appropriate authorities.76
Taylor testified that his supervisor, the principal of Goodlow, severely
reprimanded him for reporting the incident to the DCFS and the police. 77
The supervisor told Taylor that he mishandled the situation because the
special education teacher was a trained therapist who was engaging in an
effective form of “role playing” therapy with the child.78 Taylor claimed
that after the incident, his supervisor became hostile and uncommunicative
toward him, and that the Board also began a campaign of harassing
behavior against him.79 Thereafter, Taylor began to receive lower
performance ratings and was demoted to the position of social studies
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

2014 IL App (1st) 123744.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶8.
Id. at ¶ 17; 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (West 2007).
Taylor, 2014 IL App (1st) 123744. ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 11.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 12.
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teacher. He was later reassigned to supervising students who were placed
on in-school suspension.80 After experiencing back pain from intervening
between several student fights, Taylor took two leaves of absence but upon
his return, was informed that he overextended his leave.81 He was
reinstated by the Board but was notified that he would be released from the
contract a month later.82
Taylor filed suit against the Board, seeking damages for retaliatory
discharge and violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act,83 claiming that he
was discharged from his employment and subjected to an ongoing
campaign of retaliatory acts by the Board because he reported an act of
alleged abuse.84 A jury awarded Taylor over $1,000,000 in damages, which
included compensatory and emotional distress damages that arose from the
discharge and the Board’s retaliatory conduct.85
On appeal, the Board argued that Taylor could not maintain an action
for retaliatory discharge because he was not an at-will employee. The First
District agreed, noting that Taylor admitted in his testimony that he
understood that he had a four-year term and that his supervisor could
choose not to renew his employment at the end of that term.86 Because
Taylor was subject to a definite contractual term of employment and that
the Board exercised its option not to renew that term, the court concluded
that Taylor was not an at-will employee.87 Thus, the court reversed the
judgment in favor of Taylor on his retaliatory discharge claim.88
D. Dale v. South Central Illinois Mass Transit District89
In a workers’ compensation related retaliatory discharge claim, the
Fifth District analyzed the case Dale.90 The plaintiff, Richard Dale
(“Dale”), was employed as a bus driver for the defendant, South Central
Illinois Mass Transit District (“South Central”).91 Dale filed a complaint
against South Central alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising
his rights under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act.92 Dale had filed a
workers’ compensation claim after he injured his left shoulder in a work80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at ¶¶ 14–15, 16, 22.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id. at ¶29.
Id. at ¶ 1; 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/1 et seq. (2009).
Taylor, 2014 IL App (1st) 123744, ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 34, 39.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶ 54.
2014 IL App (5th) 130361.
Id. at ¶ 1.
Id.
Id.; see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq. (2010).
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related accident and was unable to work.93 Although his physician
recommended surgery, he refused and alleged that South Central
improperly disputed his claim.94 He took a 12-week approved leave of
absence under the Family Medical Leave Act,95 but his employment was
terminated after the 12 weeks expired, because he was medically unable to
return to work.96 Dale filed a complaint against South Central and alleged
that South Central engaged in the illegal practice of retaliatory discharge
when it terminated his employment as a bus driver as a result of his
exercising his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act.97 The circuit
court entered an order that granted South Central’s request for partial
summary judgment for lost wages because his lost wages were caused by
his inability to work rather than the alleged wrongful discharge.98
The circuit court also granted Dale’s request for certified questions,
under Supreme Court Rule 308(a), and were accepted for interlocutory
appeal.99 Both questions involved whether the Act’s provisions barred an
injured employee from recovering damages for lost wages in a retaliatory
discharge lawsuit when the employee is injured in a work-related accident
and is unable to work as a result.100
The court held that the employee’s damages for lost wages fell within
the exclusivity provisions of the Act.101 The court explained that the Act’s
purpose is to provide a system of imposing liability on employers without
fault for accidental work-related injuries and, in return, prohibiting common
law suits by employees against the employer.102 However, an action for
retaliatory discharge is not completely barred by the exclusivity provisions
of the Act.103 “[A]ny diminution in a plaintiff’s earnings directly related to
that plaintiff’s injury, but not connected to the employer’s tortious
discharge, is not properly included in the retaliatory discharge award.”104
The court concluded that, as a matter of law, the employee’s lost wages
were causally connected to the workplace accident, not his discharge, and
the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee to recover the lost

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Dale, 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, ¶¶ 4–6.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 5; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006).
Dale, 2014 IL App (5th) 130361, ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 28.
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id. (citing Kritzen v. Flender Corp., 226 Ill. App. 3d 541, 559, 589 N.E.2d 909, 922 (2d Dist.
1992)).
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wages.105 Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to the circuit court
for further proceedings regarding lost wages.106
IV. ARBITRATION
A. Fuqua v. SVOX AG107
To be enforceable, an arbitration agreement, like any contract, must be
valid and conscionable.108 In Fuqua, Kurt Fuqua (“Fuqua”) was employed
by the defendant, SVOX USA (“SVOX”), a technology services company
that researched and developed text-to-speech technology.109 Fuqua was
employed as the vice president of professional services due to his reputation
for creating numerous inventions in the field of computational linguistics.110
When Fuqua was offered an employment position with SVOX, he was
asked to sign an employment agreement, which contained an arbitration
clause, stating in part “[a]ny dispute or controversy arising under or in
connection with this Agreement or any other dispute concerning [Fuqua’s]
employment with [SVOX USA] shall be settled exclusively by arbitration,
conducted before a single, mutually agreed upon arbitrator.”111
Fuqua and SVOX negotiated, and the Agreement was eventually
executed.112 After only 8 months of employment at SVOX, Fuqua was
given a 90-day notice that his employment was being terminated.113 Fuqua
subsequently filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”), alleging breach of contract and unauthorized
withholding of wages.114
After many court filings by both parties in both state and federal court,
the circuit court granted SVOX’s motion to stay litigation and compel
arbitration; Fuqua appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred, because the
arbitration clause in the agreement was unconscionable and
unenforceable.115 Fuqua first argued that the arbitration clause was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, because it would be
extremely expensive for him to pursue arbitration by requiring him to
advance at least $23,619.25 to arbitrate.116 Fuqua further claimed that after
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 37.
2014 IL App (1st) 131429.
Id. at ¶¶ 35–36.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 30.
Id.
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he was terminated, he was not employable in his field due to the noncompete clause in the employment agreement, and thus, he was unable to
afford the costs of arbitration.117 Additionally, Fuqua stated that the
application of the AAA’s commercial rules to the arbitration rendered the
arbitration clause unconscionable.118 Fuqua claimed that he originally filed
a request for arbitration under the employment rules, which would allocate
fees and costs differently than the commercial rules, which the arbitrator
had decided applied in his arbitration.119 Fuqua contended that commercial
rules were designed for arbitration disputes between businesses and not for
claims arising out of employment agreements.120
In response, SVOX argued that the arbitration clause in the agreement
was valid and enforceable under the Uniform Arbitration Act and the
Federal Arbitration Act.121 SVOX contended that the arbitration clause
language was clear and that all of Fuqua’s claims in this case relate to this
employment and circumstances of his termination, which fall directly under
the arbitration clause.122 In addition, the arbitration clause met all the
requirements of a valid and enforceable contract under Illinois law because
it was negotiated between the parties and there was an offer and acceptance
as evidence by the signed agreement.123 Furthermore, there was no
evidence of any unequal bargaining power between the parties.124
Lastly, SVOX defendants asserted that the arbitrator’s application of
the commercial rules did not render the arbitration clause unconscionable
because he made that determination after carefully considering the entire
employment agreement and the AAA Rules.125 Likewise, the arbitration
was not substantively unconscionable because the terms of the arbitration
clause were not unfair because the arbitrator gave Fuqua multiple
opportunities to present evidence of financial hardship, which he failed to
prove.126
The appellate court held that SVOX defendants had the more
reasonable argument and interpretation of the applicable legal principals
and concluded that the arbitration clause was not procedurally or
substantially unconscionable.127 The court found that the agreement was
clear and easy to understand.128 Although the arbitration provision failed to
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 32; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2008).
Fuqua, 2014 IL App (1st) 131429, ¶ 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 38.
Id.
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instruct whether the employment rules or commercial rules were applicable,
it stated that the AAA rules would determine which rules would apply.129
Furthermore, Fuqua negotiated with SVOX regarding the terms of the
arbitration clause and was an active participant in the negotiations and the
terms of the contract.130 The court found no fault in the arbitrator’s ruling,
noting that he gave Fuqua an opportunity to present evidence to support his
argument of undue financial hardship.131 Therefore, the circuit court’s
judgment was affirmed and the matter was remanded with direction to
compel arbitration.132
B. City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Alliance of Police Chapter No.
240133
Illinois law also provides that an arbitration award must not threaten
public policy.134 In City of Des Plaines,135 the plaintiff, the City of Des
Plaines (“City”), sought to terminate police officer John Bueno (“Bueno”)
after concluding that Bueno used unnecessary and excessive force against
arrestees, which was in violation of the General Orders of the Des Plaines
Police Department (“Department”). The defendant, the Union, the
Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter No. 240 (“Union”), represented
Bueno.136
The parties submitted the grievance to arbitration and after a three-day
hearing, the arbitrator concluded that Bueno violated the General Orders
and ordered Bueno to be reinstated without back pay or benefits.137 The
arbitrator determined that termination was not appropriate, because the City
delayed the investigation of the alleged incident and the Department
condoned his conduct. Instead of reinstating Bueno, the City filed a motion
to vacate the arbitration award and argued that the award violated public
policy. The circuit court agreed and also denied the Union’s motion to
remand to the arbitrator to determine Bueno’s likelihood of engaging in the
same misconduct following reinstatement.138
On appeal, the Union argued that the award did not violate public
policy, because there was no well-defined public policy that mandated
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 42.
2015 IL App (1st) 140957.
See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs.
(AFSCME I), 173 Ill. 2d 299, 304, 671 N.E.2d 668, 672 (1996).
2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 15.
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termination of a police officer that was engaged in unnecessary use of
force, failure to report, or untruthfulness.139 The Union maintained that
public policy supports the award, because the Department condoned the
conduct, the City delayed its investigation of the incidents, and the City
destroyed relevant video evidence that resulted in prejudice to Bueno’s
defense.140
The First District observed that public policy analysis involves two
steps: (1) whether a well-defined and dominant public policy can be
identified, and, if so, then (2) whether the arbitrator’s award as reflected in
his interpretation of the agreement violated public policy.141 Here, the
parties offered conflicting descriptions of the public policies at stake. 142
The court held that the Union’s position improperly conflates the two-prong
test into a single inquiry—the issue is not whether the public policy requires
that an employee be terminated, but rather requires the identification of a
public policy.143 The court determined that the arbitration award implicated
a well-defined and dominant public policy, namely, the public policy
against police officers unnecessarily using force against prisoners and being
dishonest about that use of force during a subsequent investigation.144 In
analyzing the second prong, the First District held that the arbitrator did not
consider whether Bueno was likely to engage in similar misconduct
following reinstatement.145 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the
case to the arbitrator to clarify the award because it could not fully assess
the public policy implications.146
V. LABOR
A. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board147
In Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,148 the issue was
whether a high school teacher, who also acted as the collective-bargaining
representative for university employees, could be certified as an exclusive
collective-bargaining representative for both entities. The Uni Faculty
Organization, the Illinois Education Association, and the National
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at ¶ 17.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 20; AFSCME I, 173 Ill. 2d at 307, 671 N.E.2d at 673.
City of Des Plaines, 2015 IL App (1st) 140957, ¶ 22.
Id. at ¶ 23.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Id. at ¶ 39.
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Education Association (collectively the “Union”) filed a majority-interest
petition to represent “all full-time and regularly employed part-time
teaching associates at “UniHigh,” the public laboratory high school and
educational unit of the University of Illinois (“University”).149 UniHigh
accepted students who were considered exceptionally intelligent.150 The
University objected to the Union’s petition and argued that the proposed
bargaining unit was inappropriately narrow because the UniHigh teaching
associates were a small subset of the University’s non-tenured faculty
members and the petition did not seek to include all non-tenured faculty
members.151
A hearing was held before the Illinois Education Labor Relations
Board’s (“Board”) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on the Union’s
petition.152 The ALJ issued her recommended decision and order by
finding the proposed unit was appropriate and recommended the Board
certify the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative for UniHigh. 153
The Union then filed a second petition to represent all full-time and nontenure track faculty with respect to educational employees at the
University.154 During the hearing on the Union’s second petition, the Board
certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative,
and excluded UniHigh teachers from the bargaining unit.155 The University
filed a petition for direct administrative review of the Board’s decision.156
On appeal, the University argued that the Board erred in finding that
clear and convincing evidence that was presented to demonstrate the
proposed bargaining unit of UniHigh teachers would: (1) be appropriate
under section 7 of the Education Labor Act, (2) be appropriate given the
special circumstances and compelling justifications involved, and (3) not
cause undue fragmentation or a proliferation of bargaining units.157 The
Fourth District affirmed the Board’s judgment.158 The appellate court held
that UniHigh teachers shared the same skills and functions and reported to
their department’s head at UniHigh and not to anyone at the University. 159
Furthermore, UniHigh was a separate and distinct entity where UniHigh
teachers had unique conditions of employment and performed distinctly
different job duties from those of the University’s other non-tenure teaching
149. Id. at ¶ 5.
150. These students were often young because they had skipped grades and were permitted to take
college courses at the University in addition to their high school studies.
151. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 2015 IL App (4th) 140557, ¶ 6.
152. Id. at ¶ 9.
153. Id. at ¶ 20.
154. Id. at ¶ 22.
155. Id. at ¶ 27.
156. Id. at ¶ 28.
157. Id. at ¶ 33.
158. Id. at ¶ 64.
159. Id. at ¶ 43.
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faculty.160 The court noted the fact that the UniHigh interests were distinct
from those of other University faculty members supports the compelling
need for their own separate bargaining unit to represent their separate and
unique interests.161 Finally, the court held that because UniHigh operated
as its own entity separate from the University’s other operations, the
certification of the UniHigh teachers into their own bargaining unit would
not likely cause such labor instability as to disrupt the rest of the
University’s other services in the event of a dispute.162 Therefore, the court
concluded that the Board’s decision that clear and convincing evidence was
presented to support recognition of the non-presumptive bargaining unit of
the UniHigh teachers was not clearly erroneous.163
B. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board164
In another recent case, American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board
(AFSCME II),165 the court was required to determine whether an employee
was properly excluded from a collective-bargaining unit. In that case, the
petitioner, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, Council 31 (“Union”), represented a State of Illinois employee
who worked as an Information Systems Analyst II.166 The Illinois Labor
Relations Board sought to exclude the position from Union membership,
because it was a “confidential employee” position within the meaning of
section 3(c) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“Act”).167 The
Board found that the Information Systems Analyst II position qualified the
employee as a “confidential” employee under the Act, and the Union
appealed.168
In analyzing the issue, the Appellate Court, First District, first noted
that the Act’s purpose in excluding confidential employees from any
bargaining unit is to prevent employees from having their loyalties divided
between their employer, who expects confidentiality in labor relations
matters, and the union, which may seek the disclosure of management’s

160.
161.
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Id. at ¶ 48.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 59.
Id. at ¶ 60.
2014 IL App (1st) 132455.
Id. at ¶ 1.
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Id; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(c) (West 2012).
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labor relations material to gain an advantage in the bargaining process.169
The court also recognized the two tests specifically designated in the
statutory definition to determine whether a position is a “confidential”
employee position: (1) the labor-nexus test170 and (2) the authorized access
test, which an employee is considered confidential if he or she has
authorized access to information concerning matters specifically related to
the collective-bargaining process between labor and management.171 The
court ultimately held that the employee was not a confidential employee
within the meaning of section 3(c) of the Act, reasoning that the employee
did not have authorized access in the regular course of her job duties or that
any other duties qualified her as a “confidential employee”172 Accordingly,
the decision was reversed.173
C. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 v. The State of Illinois174
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
Council 31 v. The State of Illinois (AFSCME III),175 was a case of first
impression that involved a dispute over the section 6.1 of Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act.176 Section 6.1 allows the Governor the authority to
“designate” up to 3,580 state employment positions.177 Under the authority
of the statute, the Governor can file petitions, which identifies positions
occupied by the individual objectors for exclusion from their collective
bargaining units.178 Pursuant to section 6.1(b)(2), the Governor is permitted
to designate the positions, and the Illinois Relations Board (“Board”) may
approve the designation based solely on the position’s title.179 After the Act
was passed, the petitioner, the Department of Central Management Services
(“CMS”), on behalf of the Governor, filed petitions with the Board seeking
to exclude certain public employment positions from collective bargaining
units.180 AFSCME, on behalf of individuals, contested their removal from
169. Id. at ¶ 32 (citing Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty. v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. &
Mun. Emps., Council 31 (Chief Judge II), 153 Ill. 2d 508, 523, 607 N.E.2d 182, 189 (1992)).
170. Id. at ¶ 33 (Under the lexus-nexus test, which was not at issue in this case, an employee is
confidential if he or she assists in a confidential capacity in the regular course of his or her duties
a person or persons who formulate, determine or effectuate labor relations policies.).
171. AFSCME II, 2014 IL App (1st) 132455, ¶33 (citing Chief Judge II, 153 Ill.2d at 523, 607 N.E.2d
at 189).
172. Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40, 60.
173. Id. at ¶ 61.
174. 2015 IL App (1st) 133454.
175. Id.
176. Id. at ¶ 4; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1 et seq. (2013).
177. AFSCME III, 2015 IL App (1st) 133454, ¶ 1.
178. Id. at ¶ 2.
179. Id. at ¶ 15.
180. Id. at ¶ 15.
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their respective collective bargaining units and filed objections to the
petitions. The Board approved the Governor’s decision to deny the
individual’s collective bargaining rights, relying on the title of the
positions—namely, “senior public service administrator,” to determine the
Governor’s action was appropriate.181
On appeal, AFSCME argued that section 6.1 was unconstitutional,
because it deprived the designated employees of their procedural due
process rights and therefore denied them the opportunity to object to the
designations.182 However, the court held AFSCME failed to demonstrate
that procedural due process concerns rendered that statute unconstitutional,
reasoning that the time requirements of 10 days to file an objection could be
met and without any other evidence that the time requirement prevented an
employee from meaningfully challenging the Governor’s action.183
AFSCME’s argument that the delegation was improper, because the
Governor was given legislative authority to determine classifications of
employees under the Act without sufficient guiding principles, also
failed.184 The court explained that the Governor was not given a “blank
check” because he was limited to expressly stated positions, which was
subject to review by the Board.185 Finally, the court rejected the equal
protection argument, explaining that there is no dispute that the State’s
interest in governmental efficiency is legitimate and that the statute’s means
of achieving that interest are rational and reasonable.186 The statute did not
aim to strip particular people of their collective bargaining rights, but
instead focused on those persons’ employment positions.187 While section
6.1 permits certain employees to be treated differently, it was not in an
unconstitutional manner, because there is no constitutional right to public
sector collective bargaining.188 Therefore, the Board’s decision was
affirmed.189
D. Department of Central Management Services v. Illinois Labor Relations
Board190
The Governor’s designation power under section 6.1 of the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act (“Act”)191 was also challenged in the Fourth
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at ¶ 15
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶¶ 22–24.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶ 32
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 48.
2015 IL App (4th) 131022.
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District.192 In addition, section 11(e) of the Act was analyzed in
Department of Central Management Services.193 In that case, the
petitioners, the Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”)
along with the Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois Workers’
Compensation Commission, and Pollution Control Board, sought review of
a decision by the Illinois Labor Relations Board (“Board”), which found
that the positions designated by the Governor for exclusion of collective
bargaining did not qualify for designation under section 6.1(a).194 CMS
filed gubernatorial designation of exclusion petition pursuant to section 6.1
of the Act to exclude nine director positions in the Illinois Commerce
Commission, two public service administrator option 8L positions in the
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, and two scientist positions in
the Pollution Control Board.195 AFSCME filed objections to the
designations in each case, asserting that the positions did not qualify for
designation under section 6.1 because the respective entities were not
directly responsible to the Governor.196 The Illinois Labor Relations Board
(“Board”) consolidated the cases and the Board accepted the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) recommended decision to dismiss the petitions.197 On
a direct administrative review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335, the
Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding
that under the plain language of the statute, section 6.1 of the Act is not
applicable to the three entities at issue and they do not directly report to the
Governor. Therefore, the Governor cannot invoke section 6.1 to designate
positions in those agencies for exclusion from collective bargaining and
self-representation198
E. Community Unit School District No. 5 v. Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board (McLean and Woodford Counties)199
An unfair labor practice charge was addressed in the Fourth District
case McLean and Woodford Counties.200 The Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Board (“Board”) found the petitioner, Community Unit School
District No. 5 in McLean and Woodford Counties (“District”) engaged in
unfair labor practices against the respondent, the American Federation of
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6.1 (2012).
Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 2015 IL App (4th) 131022 ¶ 1. .
Id. at ¶ 1; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1(e) (2012).
Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 2015 IL App (4th) 131022, ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6, 8.
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State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) with
respect to student transportation services.201 Specifically, AFSCME alleged
the District violated various sections of the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act202 (“Act”) by contracting school bus services in retaliation
against the bus drivers and bus monitors for choosing AFSCME as their
representative and failing to bargain in good faith.203 Despite the District’s
argument that it subcontracted transportation services due to significant cost
savings, the circuit court granted a preliminary injunction and decided that
the Board raised a fair question of an unfair labor practice by the District.204
The court denied the District’s motion to stay the order granting the
injunction.205
On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed and found
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for
a preliminary injunction.206 The court noted that the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) conducted hearings and issued her recommended decision,
where she found the bus drivers and bus monitors to be engaged in
protected union activity when they chose AFSCME as their exclusive
bargaining representative.207 The ALJ found the District acted with antiunion animus when it subcontracted the transportation services and
discharged members of AFSCME’s bargaining unit.208
On direct administrative review of the Board’s order, the District
argued that the Board’s findings were erroneous.209 The Fourth District
reversed, holding that evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion of
anti-union animus on behalf of the District.210 The court noted that the ALJ
relied on the District’s decision to subcontract a portion of its transportation
services and then solicit bids for those services occurring within months of
AFSCME being certified as an exclusive representative of the bus drivers
and monitors.211
However, the evidence showed that the District
administrators responded to a growing problem—transportation—by
meeting with the union and reassigning staff and mechanics to driving duty
and entering into emergency subcontracting for transportation services.212
In fact, the transportation department’s problems were established in 2003
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and had grown significantly worse over the years.213 The court reasoned
that even if a prima facie case could be established based on the employee’s
engagement in a protected activity, the District had a legitimate business
reason for the adverse business action not only because of the cost savings,
but also because the District had experienced an excessive amount of
absences in the transportation department along with other issues that
caused District administrators and staff to spend time responding to
complaints regarding operational issues.214 The court concluded, “[A]n
employer’s ability to outsource, or threaten outsourcing, is part of the
bargaining process and an important weapon in negotiations.”215
Furthermore, the District bargained in good faith, and therefore failed to
rise to the level of an unfair labor practice.216
VI. SCHOOLS
In Illinois, a tenured teacher can only be dismissed “for cause” from
his or her employment in an action initiated by the school district.217
A. Kinsella v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago218
Misconduct by tenured teachers was addressed in two First District
cases: Kinsella,219 and Kimble v. Illinois State Board of Education.220 In
Kinsella, the defendant Board of Education for the City of Chicago
(“Board”) terminated the plaintiff-petitioner Kathleen Kinsella’s
(“Kinsella”) employment as a tenured teacher for violation of Board’s Drug
and Alcohol Free Workplace Policy when she was found to have been
under the influence of alcohol at work based on her blood-alcohol level of
0.053.221 The hearing officer found that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that Kinsella was under the influence of alcohol during a hearing and
recommended her reinstatement.222 However, the Board terminated
Kinsella, finding she was under the influence of alcohol in violation of
Board policies. Kinsella filed an appeal to the First District for
administrative review pursuant to 34-85(a)(8) of the Illinois School
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Code.223 Kinsella explained during her testimony that the night before the
incident, that she went to dinner at a restaurant and had three sangrias and
returned to work the next morning without eating anything.224
On appeal, Kinsella argued that the Board was required to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that she was under the influence of alcohol and
that she cannot be presumed to be impaired solely because of her
Breathalyzer test result.225 The court agreed, reasoning that while the odor
of alcohol provides a basis for requiring an employee to submit to testing,
the rules clearly state that an additional factor must exist before disciplinary
action is warranted—namely, the employee must be under the influence of
drugs or alcohol.226 The court noted that the Board’s manual defined under
the influence as “any mental, emotional, sensory or physical impairment
due to the use of drugs or alcohol.” The court agreed with the hearing
officer, who found that there was no evidence that Kinsella exhibited any
mental, emotional, sensory or physical impairment caused by alcohol on the
day in question.227 The court concluded that the Board’s finding was not
based on any evidence of impairment, but instead was solely based on
Kinsella’s Breathalyzer test result.228 Therefore, the Board’s decision that
Kinsella was “under the influence” and that her conduct was cause for
dismissal was arbitrary and the decision was reversed.229
B. Kimble230
In Kimble, plaintiff Sharon Kimble (“Kimble”) was a tenured teacher
with 20 years of service to Parkside Academy when her employment was
terminated by the defendant, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago
(“Board”), after allegations that she pushed and choked a 10-year old
student.231 The incident was reported to the Department of Children and
Family Services (“DCFS”), which determined that the allegations of abuse
were unfounded. However, the Board approved the dismissal charges
against Kimble based on hearing officer’s recommendation and the Chicago
Public Schools’ employee discipline and due process policy, which
prohibited the use of corporal punishment.232 Kimble filed a complaint for
administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County, claiming that the
223.
224.
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227.
228.
229.
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Board’s decision was contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the
evidence.233 The appeal focused on the fact that Kimble was the only
person who witnessed the alleged event and the only person to testify at the
hearing.234
The circuit court reversed in part and remanded for further findings of
fact, holding that the hearing contained inadmissible hearsay and that the
factual basis of the hearing officer’s recommendation was not apparent
from the record.235 The circuit court affirmed on further administrative
review after the hearing officer issued a clarification and the Board issued a
supplemental order.236 On appeal, Kimble argued that she was denied her
right to due process because the admission of the child’s hearsay testimony
violated her right to confront her accuser as well as denied her right to
notice of the specific charges against her.237 The court agreed and
emphasized the inappropriateness of the decision given the fact that the
tenured teacher’s termination after 20 years of service was based almost
entirely on hearsay statements of one student who was not present at the
hearing.238 Furthermore, there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged incident
and the teacher denied the conduct. Therefore, the court concluded that the
termination of a tenured teacher’s employment without giving her the
opportunity to cross-examine the accuser violated due process and the
Board’s decision was reversed.239
VII. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act240 (“Act”) affords
economic relief to employees who, through no fault of his or her own,
become involuntarily unemployed.241 However, a former employee may
not receive benefits under the Act if his or her discharge was for
misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as when: (i) the employer has a
reasonable work policy or rule that (ii) the employee deliberately and
willfully violates, and (iii) the violation either harms the employer or was
repeated by the employee despite a warning.242 In 2014, two First District

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at ¶ 59.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 76.
Id. at ¶ 84.
Id. at ¶¶ 84, 88.
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/602 (2012).
AFM Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 198 Ill. 2d 380, 396, 763 N.E.2d 272, 282
(2001).
242. Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 2012 IL App (1st) 101639, ¶ 19.

2015]

Survey of Illinois Law: Employment Law

635

decisions analyzed whether employees were discharged for misconduct,
and came to opposing conclusions.
A. Baker v. Department of Employment Security243
Unemployment benefits were properly denied in Baker.244 In that
case, plaintiff Ronald Baker was employed as an electrician for the Chicago
Park District (“Park District”) for 14 years before he was discharged for
violating the Park District’s code of conduct for violence in the
workplace.245 Baker was reported after he had an argument with his coworkers and supervisors. Baker allegedly said he might “go Arizona” on
his supervisors.246 The supervisors took the reference to the Arizona
killings247 as a threat, filed a police report, and terminated Baker’s
employment.
As a result of his termination, Baker applied for
unemployment insurance benefits but was denied due to the fact that he was
discharged for misconduct.248 Baker appealed for reconsideration of his
claim and a referee investigated. Baker’s supervisor told the referee that he
felt threatened after Baker’s comments.249 After questioning the human
resources manager and his supervisor, the referee concluded that he was
discharged due to misconduct as defined in the Unemployment Insurance
Act250 and was subject to disqualification of benefits under that section.251
Baker then appealed to the Board of Review (“Board”), which affirmed the
referee’s decision and found that the further investigating of evidence was
unnecessary.252
The circuit court affirmed the decision and Baker appealed.253 In an
appeal from an administrative review proceeding, the court reviewed the
decision of the Board rather than that of the circuit court. The First District
first noted that an employee willfully violates a rule or policy when he is
aware of and consciously disregards that rule. Baker argued that his remark
was not threatening, he did not appear angry, and he did not raise his voice
when he made the remark.254 The court recognized that the Park District’s
243.
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2014 IL App (1st) 123669.
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Baker, 2014 IL App (1st) 123669, ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 6.
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policy forbade any comment creating a reasonable fear of injury to another
person.255 Baker’s remark referred to a violent fatal shooting incident that
occurred just weeks earlier and was directed individually to each of the coworkers in Baker’s presence. Furthermore, the referee concluded that
Baker’s supervisor interpreted the remark as intent by Baker to cause great
bodily harm. Therefore, the Board’s conclusion that the facts constituted
misconduct was not clearly erroneous.256
B. Universal Security Corporation v. Department of Employment
Security257
The court found that unemployment benefits were wrongly denied in
Universal Security Corporation.258 In that case, defendant Darvin Hooker
(“Hooker”) was employed by Universal Security Corporation (“Universal”)
as an unarmed night security guard at O’Hare International Airport.259
After only three months of employment, Hooker was caught sleeping while
on duty by his supervisor. After his termination, Hooker sought
unemployment insurance benefits but was denied under the Illinois
Unemployment Insurance Act (“Act”)260 because he had deliberately and
willfully violated Universal’s policy, which prohibited sleeping on the job.
Hooker appealed and a referee investigated. During the investigation,
Hooker explained that he had temporarily dozed off on duty because he was
tired from working two jobs. In fact, on the night of the incident, he had
reported to work a few hours after a 10-hour shift at his other job. In
determining whether Hooker engaged in a deliberate and willful violation
under the Act, the referees concluded that Hooker did not deliberately and
willfully fall asleep and therefore did not commit “misconduct.” Therefore,
Hooker was permitted to claim unemployment insurance benefits.
Universal appealed the referee’s decision to the Board of Review of the
Department. However, the Board agreed with the referee and explained
“falling asleep on the job is willful only if an individual purposely takes a
nap.”261 The fact that Hooker dozed off in an open area where all could
observe him showed a lack of intent. Universal appealed yet again to the
First District after the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.262
The First District Appellate Court agreed that to be considered
“deliberate and willful,” the Act requires the conduct be intentional. In
255.
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examining the legislative intent of the Act, the court noted that definition of
misconduct expressly rejected the argument that carelessness or negligence
alone should be equated with willful and deliberate misconduct.263 The
court held that the circumstances did not show that Hooker intended to fall
asleep at work given the fact that he was asleep for only a short interval and
in an upright sitting position in public view.264 Thus, Hooker was eligible
for unemployment benefits and the Board’s decision was not clearly
erroneous, despite the fact that Universal had every reason to fire him for
sleeping on the job.265
C. McCleary v. Wells Fargo Securities266
Written bonus plans as they applied to unemployment benefits were
examined in McCleary267 Plaintiff, Thomas McCleary (“McCleary”), was
the director of sales for the defendant, Wells Fargo Securities, L.L.C.
(“Wells Fargo”).268 As part of his compensation, he was eligible to
participate in the “Wells Fargo Securities Group Bonus Plan (“Plan”). The
Plan specified that former employees who worked at least three months
during the bonus period, met their performance objectives, and were
discharged for non-performance reasons, would generally be eligible for
pro-rated bonuses. After his job was eliminated, McCleary wanted to
continue to participate in the Plan.269 However, a bonus pool was created to
pay performance bonuses for the current calendar year, and McCleary was
not awarded a performance bonus under the Plan.270 McCleary requested
an internal company review of Wells Fargo’s decision, but was informed
that although he was eligible, Wells Fargo retained “absolute discretion” to
determine a bonus award based on a number of factors and ultimately
determined that he would not receive a bonus payment.271 However, Wells
Fargo failed to identify any factors that influenced its decision.272
McCleary filed a complaint and alleged that the Plan was legally
enforceable and the failure to include him in the bonus pool and pay him a
prorated bonus for his performance year was a breach of the parties’
agreement.273 The circuit court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss,
263.
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273.
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Id. at ¶ 20.
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finding that the language in the Plan gave Wells Fargo the “absolute
discretion to determine whether a bonus should be awarded and, if so, the
amount, ultimately undermines the claim here in all counts.”274 On appeal,
the First District reversed, concluding that McCleary sufficiently pled
claims to support a violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act.275 The circuit court erred when it dismissed McCleary’s amended
complaint in its entirely based on its finding that Wells Fargo’s “absolute
discretion” under the Plan undermined McCleary’s claims.276 However,
McCleary sufficiently pled that Wells Fargo abused its discretion by
amending the Plan in order to disqualify McCleary’s participation in the
bonus pool and be awarded a prorated bonus. Thus, the judgment was
reversed and remanded.277
VIII. PENSION AND OTHER FRINGE BENEFITS
A. Vaughn v. City of Carbondale278
At issue in Vaughn,279 was the termination of a police officer’s
employer-provided health insurance coverage in accordance with section 10
of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (“Act”).280 While on duty,
Officer Jeffrey Vaughn (“Vaughn”) was stopped by a motorist who was
asking for directions when he received a request from dispatch to respond
over the radio.281 As he reached inside the squad car for the radio, he struck
the top of his head on the doorframe, causing him immediate pain to his
head and sharp pain in his arm.282 He sought medical attention after his
shift, and the physician recommended that he remain off duty.283 Vaughn
initially received line-of-duty disability pension benefits pursuant to section
3-114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code,284 but the Carbondale Police Pension
Board (“Board”) eventually terminated the payments after concluding that
Vaughn was not injured as a result of his employment.285
Vaughn filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit
court. The court affirmed the Board’s decision to terminate Vaughn’s
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disability pension payments.286 Vaughn appealed the decision, arguing that
the City should be required to permanently provide health insurance
pursuant to the Act because there was no statutory basis to terminate the
provided insurance coverage once awarded.287 In response, the City argued
that Vaughn was not entitled to lifetime health insurance coverage under
the Act because his work-related injury was not incurred as a result of his
response to fresh pursuit or his response to what he reasonably believed was
an emergency.288
The Fifth District observed that pursuant to section 10 of the Act, a
full-time law enforcement officer and their family are eligible to receive
health insurance benefits if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the officer must
have suffered a catastrophic injury in the line of duty, and (2) the injury
must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit or
the officer’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an
unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a
criminal act.289 The Fifth District reversed the circuit court’s decision,
concluding that the evidence supported the finding that the plaintiff was
injured during the course of his employment and was therefore eligible for a
line-of-duty pension.290 The court reasoned that Vaughn’s work-related
injury occurred as a result of his response to what he reasonably believed
was an emergency. Specifically, the court recognized that although there
was no evidence presented that the dispatch call resulted in an emergency
situation, it was an officer’s duty to respond to dispatch calls in a timely
manner and to be prepared for any eventuality.291 An officer cannot know
the nature of the call until he responds.292 The evidence established that
Vaughn was engaged in the act of responding to what he believed was a
potential emergency that could have been involved in imminent danger to a
person or property and therefore required an urgent response.293 Thus, the
court reversed and remanded the judgment.294
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B. Majid v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund
of the City of Chicago295
Majid is another interesting case involving a police officer’s disability
benefits.296 The plaintiff, Nail Majid, served as a Chicago police officer
from 1999 until he was injured in 2003.297 He was awarded a line-of-duty
disability benefit and subsequently relocated to Ohio.298 While in Ohio, he
was indicted and charged with two felony offenses: two counts of
impersonating an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency299 and one count
of possession of an unregistered firearm.300 Majid pled guilty to possession
of an unregistered firearm pursuant to a plea agreement and he was
sentenced to three years’ probation.301 The Retirement Board of the
Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (“Board”)
suspended Majid’s disability benefits pending a hearing upon learning of
the felony conviction.302 Majid argued before the Board that he was
convicted of a felony under the federal classification, and therefore the
possession of an unregistered weapon charge should not be considered a
felony for purposes of section 5-227.303 Furthermore, Majid argued that
section 5-227 was ambiguous.304 The Board found that it was undisputed
that Majid had been convicted of a felony while receiving disability
benefits and issued a written order denying Majid’s application for
reinstatement.305 Majid appealed and the circuit court affirmed the Board’s
decision.306 On further appeal to the First District, Majid argued that the
Board ignored the legislative intent that the felony conviction must have a
nexus with his service as a police office before disability benefits could be
terminated.307
The court disagreed, reasoning that the Majid’s
interpretation of section 5-227 conflicted with previous court opinions.308
Majid further argued that the hearing at which his disability benefit was
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terminated violated his right to procedural due process under the Illinois
Constitution and the United States Constitution because he did not have the
opportunity to argue that his felony conviction was not related to his service
as a police officer and because his wife was not called as a witness.309 The
court disagreed, holding that the nexus issue was previously addressed and
that his own testimony established the basis for the forfeiture of his
disability benefit.310 Therefore, the decision of the Board and the circuit
court’s holding were affirmed, and the termination of Majid’s disability
benefits was proper.311
IX. MISCELLANEOUS EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CASES
A. Negligent Hiring and Retention
The Second District affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Boy
Scouts of America (“BSA”) in Doe v. Boy Scouts of America,312 a case
involving the sexual assault of a minor boy scout by a former employee of a
local scouting council. The plaintiff, Jane Doe (“Doe”), the mother of John
Doe (“John”), filed a complaint alleging that BSA was negligent in
screening, hiring and retaining a man who sexually assaulted her son after
the employment with BSA had been terminated. Doe alleged that BSA
should have known that the perpetrator posed a threat of sexual abuse to
children and that BSA failed to conduct background checks on new or
existing scout leaders, employees or volunteers.313 BSA moved for
summary judgment, denying that it had any duty to protect John when the
sexual assaults occurred, because the perpetrator was no longer employed
by the BSA.314 In response, Doe argued that a duty of care arose, because
BSA voluntarily undertook to protect scouts from dangerous individuals
such as pedophiles.315
The circuit court determined there was no material fact question on
negligence and that BSA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
court held that the perpetrator was no longer employed by BSA when the
incident occurred and that BSA adequately executed all voluntary
protective measures that they undertook.316 Doe appealed, but the Second
District affirmed the decision, finding that it was not reasonably foreseeable
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that the perpetrator would sexually molest young boys.317 Moreover, there
was no evidence that BSA intended to continue to protect John after
perpetrator was terminated, and, therefore, did not voluntarily undertake the
duty to protect young from sexual predators as alleged by Doe.318
B. Illinois Personnel Record Review Act
Harrison v. Deere & Co.319 was one of three lawsuits filed by plaintiff
Andre Harrison (“Harrison”) in response to the termination of his
employment be the defendant, Deere & Company (“Deere”). In this case,
Harrison claimed violations by Deere under the Illinois Personnel Record
Review Act (“Act”)320 when Deere assembled an investigative record of his
associations, communications and non-employment activities and failed to
provide him a copy of the report, which supported his discharge within the
appropriate time period.321 The investigation was initiated due to
allegations that Harrison had engaged in sexual misconduct with
subordinate employees.322 Harrison was fired a month later for violation of
company policy, which prohibited managers from engaging in sexual
relationships with subordinate employees.323
Harrison subsequently
requested a copy of his personnel file and the corresponding investigative
report, which disclosed the facts of the investigation.324 However, Harrison
received the personnel file without the investigative report. Thereafter, he
filed a complaint seeking enforcement of section 2 of the Act with the
Department of Labor.325 Harrison finally received the investigative records
after a request by his attorney.326 In his complaint, Harrison alleged that
these activities were racially motivated, constituted an invasion of his
privacy and resulted in his wrongful termination.327
The circuit court held in favor of Deere and Harrison appealed,
arguing that Deere did not submit the appropriate personnel documents with
the seven-day time frame required by section 2 of the Act, and, should,
therefore, be subject to the penalty imposed by the statute which provides
for $200 plus costs, reasonable attorney’s fees and actual damages.328 In
determining whether Deere’s violation was willful, the court concluded that
317.
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Harrison was not eligible for attorneys’ fees, because the court did not
compel Deere to comply with the statutory requirements to produce the
report for inspection and Deere complied without any need for Harrison to
hire counsel.329 However, the court found that Deere was subject to a petty
offense for violating a provision of the Act by providing Harrison with the
complete set of records in 25 working days rather than the statutorily
required seven days.330 Harrison’s invasion of privacy and wrongful
termination arguments also failed because they were barred by res
judicata.331 Therefore, the circuit court’s decision was affirmed.332
C. Whistleblower Act
In Larsen v. Provena Hospitals,333 the Fourth District analyzed the
Illinois Whistleblower Act334 as applied to a physician’s employment. In
that case, the defendant, Provena Hospitals (“Provena”) declined to renew
the medical staff membership and clinical privileges of plaintiff, Dr. L.
Royce Larsen (“Larsen”) after his 31 years of service.335 Larsen filed a
complaint alleging that Provena retaliated against him because he had made
reports to government agencies that revealed Provena’s violations of
various state and federal laws.336 Larsen sought damages as a result of
Provena’s alleged willful and wanton misconduct in harming his medical
practice and professional reputation.337 Provena filed a motion to dismiss
Larsen’s complaint on the basis that Larsen did not sufficiently plead
willful and wanton conduct under section 10.2 of the Hospital Act.338
Furthermore, Larsen was not a protected employee under the Whistleblower
Act because Larsen failed to allege that Provena received state funding.339
The circuit court partially granted Provena’s motion to dismiss,
finding that harm to a physician’s medical practice and professional
reputation was not the type of harm required to state a claim for willful and
wanton misconduct under the Hospital Act.340 Yet, the court denied
Provena’s motion to dismiss Larsen’s retaliation claim, finding in part that
the Whistleblower Act applied due to Provena’s state funding in the form of
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Medicaid payments.341 On interlocutory appeal,342 the court was presented
with four certified questions, which addressed whether Larsen’s status as an
employee was protected under the Whistleblower Act.343 The court noted
that section 5 of the Whistleblower Act defined an employee as an
individual who is “employed on a full-time, part-time, or contractual basis
by an employer and includes, but is not limited to, a licensed physician who
practices his or her profession in whole or in part, at a hospital, nursing
home, clinic or any medical facility that is a health care facility funded, in
whole or in part, by the State.”344 The court determined that the answer to
the question depended on the interpretation of the last phrase the
definition—whether a health care facility was funded, in whole or in part,
by the State.345 Provena argued that Medicaid benefits were not state funds
as contemplated by section 30 of the Whistleblower Act.346 The court
disagreed with Provena’s argument but nevertheless determined that a
Medicaid payment is not funding as contemplated by section 5 of the
Whistleblower Act.347 The court answered the first question in the
affirmative and the remaining three in the negative, and the case was
remanded.348
D. Drug Free Workplace Policy
The First District analyzed an interesting issue relating to the
relatively new statute known as the Drug Free Workplace Act.349 In
Walker, Cook County deputy sheriff Mister Walker (“Walker”) was
selected randomly by a computer for a drug test.350 Walker’s sample
testified positive for oxazepam,351 which is a controlled substance under
schedule IV of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.352 An investigation
followed and a complaint was filed.353 At the hearing before the Cook
County Sheriff’s Merit Board (“Merit Board”), an investigator testified that
although the prescription bottle was dated from 1995, Walker had told her
341.
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that a now-deceased doctor prescribed the medication.354 The investigator
concluded that the 1995 prescription was not a valid prescription at the time
of testing and Walker was therefore in violation of the drug policy.355
At trial, Walker testified that before he was employed by the sheriff
for 32 years, he had served in the Vietnam War and suffered from medical
conditions stemming from exposure to Agent Orange356 and has taken
prescription medications at various times to help him sleep and for anxiety
as needed.357 Despite Walker’s justification, the Merit Board issued a
decision, which resulted in Walker’s termination due to the violation of the
drug policy.358 Walker filed a complaint for administrative review in the
circuit court, but the court affirmed the Merit Board’s decision.359
Walker appealed and argued that the Merit Board’s decision was
erroneous because the drug policy did not state that employees were
prohibited from taking validly obtained prescription drugs after a certain
period of time elapsed since the prescription was filled.360 On the other
hand, the defendants, the Merit Board and Cook County Sheriff Thomas
Dart, contended that the drug policy can be violated in three ways: (1) the
presence of drugs or controlled substances in the employee’s system; (2)
the use of non-prescribed controlled substances; and (3) the abuse of legally
prescribed drugs or controlled substances.361 The court reversed the
decision, holding that the Merit Board’s conclusion was not supported by
an appropriate statute, ordinance or rule.362 The defendants cited to section
312(a) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which the court
determined, was directed only at pharmacists.363 Furthermore, the court
held that there was no medical testimony to establish that taking medication
from an older prescription bottle was not within the limits of “a medically
valid prescription” or that Walker’s conduct was an abuse of prescription
medication.364 Therefore, the court concluded that the evidence used to
support the unwritten drug policy was based on speculation and was
therefore against the manifest weight of evidence.365
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X. CONCLUSION
The courts provided some well-reasoned decisions during this period
of time.
In a case of first impression, Section 6.1 of the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act was in dispute in an action filed by AFSCME challenging
removal of certain positions from the collective bargaining unit as
unconstitutional. The court upheld that classifications based on certain
positions did not violate procedural due process under the constitution.
It continues to be difficult to obtain a decision denying unemployment
benefits based on the willful and deliberate language in the definition of
misconduct in the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act. Violence or
threats of violence seem to be treated differently in that the first occurrence
of a violation of a workplace violence policy is usually enough to be
considered misconduct. It does not have to be repeated after a warning, and
is almost always determined to be willful and deliberate. Most other
misconduct will take repeated violations of rule or policy or some proven
harm, which is often hard to quantify.
Employers in Illinois who wish to retain discretion regarding to whom
to award bonuses, should carefully review their written bonus plans before
implementation. If an employee is able to sufficiently plead their claims
that the employer abused its discretion in amending a bonus plan to
disqualify an employee’s participation, the employee may succeed in
obtaining payment under the bonus plan.

